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Civil Rights. Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commis-
sion for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457 (R.I. 1996). Neither alcohol-
ism nor drug dependency is a handicap within the meaning of the
Fair Employment Practices Act.
In Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for
Human Rights,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered
whether alcohol and drug dependency are handicaps under the
Fair Employment Practices Act.2 The supreme court, quashing a
superior court decision, held that the statute unambiguously ex-
cludes alcohol and drug dependency as handicaps. 3
FACTS AND TR tVEL
In the fall of 1988, Dennis Santos (Santos), was hired as a
merchandiser by Wayne Distributing Co. (Wayne), a beverage dis-
tributor.4 On November 4, 1988, Santos notified Wayne's director
of marketing that he was entering a residential substance abuse
treatment facility.5 Three days later, Santos received a registered
letter from Wayne stating that his employment was terminated.8
The letter did not give any reason for the discharge.7 On January
24, 1989, Santos filed a discrimination complaint with the Rhode
Island Commission of Human Rights (Commission) alleging that
his termination was the result of his "physical and mental handi-
caps in violation of § 28-5-7."8 As part of its investigation, the
Commission held a hearing, at which Santos's supervisor gave sev-
eral reasons for the dismissal, none of which were found credible
by the Commission.9 Finding that Santos was a recovering alco-
holic and a drug-dependent person in treatment at the time of his
1. 673 A-2d 457 (R.I. 1996).
2. R.I. Gen- Laws § 28-5-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
3. Wayne Distrib., 673 A-2d at 460.
4. Id. at 458. Santos was hired on a 90 day probationary period, and his job
of setting up promotional displays at beverage retailers required him to drive a
car. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Santos was released from the treatment facility on November 20,
1988. Id. at 459.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Santos's supervisor testified that several of their clients complained that
Santos did not complete his work, and in one month, Santos was absent from work
for "unexplained 'personal reasons.'" Id.
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discharge, the Commission held that Santos was discharged be-
cause of his handicap, which constituted employment discrimina-
tion under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. 10
After the superior court affirmed the Commission's decision,
Wayne filed a petition for certiorari with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court which was granted."
BACKGROUND
With the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, the
General Assembly *established broad protections against employ-
ment discrimination for handicapped persons- 2 The statute pro-
vides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice . .. for
any employer... [t]o refuse to hire any applicant for employment
because of his [or her] . .. handicap."' 3 "Handicap" is defined by
the statute as "any physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities."14 "Physical or
mental impairment" is further defined as "any physiological disor-
der or condition.., or any mental or psychological disorder, such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."'5
Although neither alcoholism nor drug addiction are specifi-
cally enumerated in the Rhode Island statute, other jurisdictions
have interpreted comparable statutes to determine whether alco-
holism and drug dependency constitute protected handicaps, and
they have reached differing results.' 6 The New York Court of Ap-
10. RI. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996). As a penalty, the Commis-
sion ordered Wayne to pay Santos lost wages and benefits, with interest, and attor-
ney fees. Wayne Distrib., 673 A.2d at 459.
11. Id.
12. R.I. Gen- Laws § 28-5-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
13. Id § 28-5-6(7).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 28-5-6(7)(A) (emphasis added).
16. Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1986) (alcoholism
or drug abuse are handicaps for civil rights statute); Consolidated Freightways,
Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Comm'n, 366 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1985) (alcoholism
could constitute disability); Braun v. American Int'l Health & Rehabilitation Serv.,
Inc., 846 P.2d 1151, 1157 (Or. 1993) (alcoholism is a "physical or mental impair-
ment" within the meaning of the statute); Phillips v. City of Seattle, 754 P.2d 116
(Wash. Ct App. 1988) (periodic alcoholism is not a handicap within employment
discrimination statute).
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peals found that alcoholism was a "mental disability"'7 within the
meaning of the New York Human Rights Law.' 8 Conversely, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that alcoholism was not a "physical
handicap" for employment discrimination purposes1s
ANALysis ANsm HOLDING
In Wayne Distributing, the defendant contended that alcohol
and drug dependency qualified as handicaps under the "broad
sweeping language" of the Fair Employment Practices Act.20 The
defendant also argued that because the statute does not specifi-
cally list what conditions constitute handicaps, alcoholism should
be included.21 The court disagreed, noting that the statute does
not include alcoholism or drug dependency as a handicap, so in-
cluding them "would run contra to the well-recognized presump-
tion that every word, sentence or provision of the statute was
intended for some useful purpose and has some force and effect."22
In support of its opinion, the court stated that neither alcoholism
nor drug dependency could constitute a "physiological disorder
pursuant to § 28-5-6(7)(A)." 23 Next, the court held that the list of
mental disorders enumerated in the statute limited the more gen-
eral phrase, "any mental or psychological disorder."2 4 Since the
court found that the unenumerated disorders, alcoholism and drug
dependency, were not "similar in kind" to those listed in the stat-
ute, it concluded that the legislature must not have intended them
17. In re McEniry v. Landi, 644 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (N.Y. 1994) (An employee
should not be fired for pre-rehabilitation alcohol related absenteeism where the
employee has been rehabilitated and then performs the job in a satisfactory
manner.).
18. Id- at 1021 (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1) (McKinney 1996)).
19. Welsh v. Municipality of Anchorage, 676 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1984).
20. Wayne Distrib. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 673 A.2d
457, 459 (R.I. 1996).
21. Id. The Commission filed a brief in support of Santos's position, relying on
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213, which in-
cludes recovering alcoholics and drug dependent persons who are in rehabilitation
programs. Id.
22. Wayne Distrib., 673 A.2d at 460-61 (citing Providence Journal Co. v. Ma-
son, 359 A.2d 682, 687 (RI. 1976)).
23. Id. at 460. The court stated that alcohol and drug dependency "clearly
cannot be considered a 'physiological disorder'" under the statute. Id. However, it
did not elaborate why it so quickly eliminated this category. Id.
24. Id- at 460-61.
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to be covered, and the judiciary is "not privileged to legislate, by
inclusion, words which are not found in the statute."25
CONCLUSION
An employee dismissed for alcohol or drug dependency cannot
prevail in an action for employment discrimination under the
Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, as construed by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. According to the court, the Rhode
Island Legislature limited coverage under this Act to specifically
enumerated, or similar, disorders, and found that neither alcohol-
ism nor drug dependency met those criteria. Assuming that the
court is correct in deciding that substance abuse disorders are not
physiological, it is still possible that the legislature intended that
alcohol and drug abuse be included as "mental or psychological"
disorders. The words "such as" precede the list of covered condi-
tions, suggesting that the enumeration was meant to be illustra-
tive, not exhaustive. Of course, if the court read the statute more
narrowly than the legislature intended, a statutory amendment
may be on the horizon.
Tracy Kelly Doorley
25. Id. at 460.
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